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éH11: Examiner la médecine d’aujourd’hui par l’épistémologie historique

11e journées d’études sur l’épistémologie historique

09-10 avril 2026

MSH Paris Nord

ÉpistHist. Research Network on the History and the Methods of Historical Epistemology

Contact : epistemologiehistorique@gmail.com

Informations pratiques : Les journées se tiendront à la MSH Paris nord, dans l’auditorium.

Programme : 

Jour 1 :

9h30-10h accueil

Session 1 : (chair Lucie Fabry)

10h-10h45 Urte Laukaityte, Aarhus University.

The Role of History and Philosophy of Science in Medicine: Ontology, Epistemology, and Illness

10h45-11h30 David Simard, Université Paris Est – Créteil.

Éclairer la controverse sur les voies de transmission de la COVID-19 par l’épistémologie historique

11h30-11h50 : pause

11h50-12h35 Silvia De Cesare, Utrecht University.

Health beyond the individual: Canguilhem meets “One Health”

Session 2 (chair Perceval Pillon)

14h15-15h Philippe Albou, Société Française d’Histoire de la Médecine.

Évolution de la classification des « démences » en regard de l’évolution des techniques

15h-15h20 : pause

15h20-16h05 Guglielmo Militello, Université de Bordeaux.

Repenser l’oncologie au prisme canguilhémien : le cancer comme nouvelle normativité biologique

16h05-16h50 Jonathan Racine, Université Toulouse-Jean Jaurès.

Paradigme et / ou dispositif ? Utiliser l’épistémologie historique pour penser les relations de la cancérologie et de la médecine personnalisée

16h50-17h20 discussion générale

 

Jour 2 : 

Session 3 : (chair Philippe Musette)

10h-10h45 Cécilia Bognon Küss, Sorbonne Université.

Métabolisme et reproduction: réactiver une porosité oubliée

10h45-11h05 : pause

11h05-11h50 Clémence Thébaut, Université de Bordeaux.

La naissance de l’épidémiologie clinique au prisme de la typologie des épistémès de Foucault

Session 4 : (chair Caroline Angleraux)

14h-15h Cornelius Borck, University of Lübeck.

Rare diseases – on the multiple socio-epistemic effects of a regulatory intervention

15h-15h20 : pause

15h20-16h05 Laurence Dufour-Villeneuve, Université de Montréal, Université de Mons.

Vers une méthode de la double vision : l’endométriose, savoirs situés et causalité médicale

16h05-16h50 Marco Dal Pozzolo, Université Paris Cité.

Notes d’histoire épistémologique sur la médecine du travail

16h50-17h20 discussion générale

 

 

Comité d’organisation :

Caroline Angleraux (iBrain U1253, INSERM de Tours)
Lucie Fabry (LIR3S, Université de Bourgogne)
Lisa Malich (IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck)
Iván Moya-Diez (IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck)
Perceval Pillon (IHPST, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS)
Matteo Vagelli (CFS, Università di Pisa)

Avec le soutient de:

IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck.

IHPST (UMR 8590).

Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS.

LIR3S (UMR7366),  Université de Bourgogne/CNRS.

CFP 11th Workshop on Historical Epistemology

Call for Papers
11th International Workshop on Historical Epistemology:
Examining Current Medicine through Historical Epistemology

Organized by:
EpistHist
Research Network on the History and the Methods of Historical Epistemology

Dear all,

We are pleased to share the call for proposals for the historical epistemology workshop on the theme: “Examining Contemporary Medicine through Historical Epistemology”. It will take place on 9–10 April 2026 at MSH Paris Nord (Paris, France).

This workshop is the 11th edition of the annual meetings of the International Research Network on Historical Epistemology. Its aim is not so much to demarcate historical epistemology as a narrowly defined field by sharply distinguishing it from other approaches to the study of science, but rather to create a space for dialogue on a plurality of philosophical inquiries concerning the history of knowledge. What unites these approaches is their shared focus on the conditions under which scientific fields and their objects emerged. Historical epistemology, in this broad sense, aims to describe and critically assess the dynamics specific to the historicity of a scientific object in order to shed light on present questions.

The aim of this 11th edition is to draw on the resources of historical epistemology to examine the biomedical sciences, particularly their most contemporary practices. While historical epistemology has been applied to a very wide range of fields in the natural sciences, formal knowledge and the human sciences, it is equally true that the medical sciences have long constituted one of the most significant areas of application for this approach, at least since the work of Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault. Georges Canguilhem sought to understand the epistemological specificity of the life sciences and to clarify the relationship between scientific research and therapeutic practices in the knowledge of living organisms. The different stages of Michel Foucault’s work contributed to questioning different aspects of medical discourse and practices, from The Birth of the Clinic to the study of forms of biopower. Following in their footsteps, Ian Hacking investigated the role of statistical reasoning in medicine and demonstrated, through the notion of the looping effect, how psychiatric classifications in turn transform the behaviour of the individuals they target. More recently, the fruitfulness of this tradition for the analysis of contemporary medicine has been illustrated in a growing body of work (e.g. Gaille 2014, Giroux 2010). In line with this research, we are therefore organising a workshop devoted to the study of medical knowledge, healthcare practices and health policies through the lens of historical epistemology.

 

While it is of course possible to submit contributions that offer a reinterpretation of seminal texts in the historical epistemology of medicine, this workshop will be structured around three main themes:

 

  1. Beyond dichotomies: conceptual tools for thinking about medicine

Historical epistemology has identified several fundamental conceptual pairs for studying medicine, such as normal/pathological, analytical medicine/synthetic medicine, practitioner/patient. These distinctions, which structure Canguilhem’s thinking on medical knowledge, have been reinvested in the analysis of contemporary phenomena: patient triage (Lachenal, Lefève, Nguyen 2014), the figure of the expert patient (Lefève 2014), predictive medicine (Olivier 2021), and computational medicine (Corteel 2019). The book edited by Mathieu Arminjon, Pierre-Olivier Méthot and Céline Cherici (2022) revisits the distinction between normal and pathological in light of contemporary transformations in medicine (psychiatry, microbiome biology, epidemiology, etc.) and thus shows how a renewed use of these categories can serve as a tool for analysing modern medicine.

However, many questions remain open. For example, the ability of historical epistemology to articulate scientific knowledge, healthcare organisation and social values can be used to analyse forms of epistemic injustice in medicine. Similarly, the pluralisation of the medical world (which is no longer reducible to the doctor/patient relationship alone, but involves a constellation of health professionals and institutional structures) calls for a renewed use of the conceptual tools of historical epistemology. Finally, the growing integration of artificial intelligence into medical practices further complicates this landscape. Whether it be self-diagnostic devices or the use of AI to bypass professional consultations (e.g. in mental health), many contemporary issues remain to be illuminated by the French tradition and are likely, in turn, to fuel the reinterpretation of classical concepts.

Beyond the few cases mentioned here, this first line of research proposes to explore how the conceptual tools of historical epistemology can be reinvested to account for current transformations in medicine, moving beyond inherited dichotomies and opening up new critical perspectives.

  1. The methods of proof in medicine

Historical epistemology studies how scientific fields employ the concepts of truth, proof, and error. Applied to medicine, it reminds us that medicine is not simply a field for technical application of biological knowledge; its concepts, methods, and criteria for validity are imbued with values. In particular, history has shown that medicine, as a field of specific knowledge production, had to develop its own concept of proof, both descriptive and normative. Several contemporary issues can be addressed from this perspective. For example, the use of massive databases, derived in particular from biomarker sequencing or medical imaging, raises questions about the nature of data and the conditions under which medical knowledge is produced. In this respect, the emergence of personalized medicine and the development of evidence-based medicine, for example, highlight these concerns. The growing integration of artificial intelligence is further complicating this landscape. In certain fields, such as medical image recognition, AI systems are outperforming humans (for example, in the identification of malaria parasites). However, their epistemological status remains uncertain. 

Methodological issues surrounding evidence are also crucial (Allamel-Raffin 2019). Since their emergence in the mid-20th century, randomized controlled trials (RCTs) have become the gold standard for evaluating treatments (Fagot-Largeault 1992), but their limitations are debated: their ability to establish causal inferences is limited, and they provide little insight into the underlying biological mechanisms. Other approaches (case-control, observational, or experimental studies) offer alternatives, but they in turn raise debates about the validity and robustness of inferences. Methodological choices shape what is accepted as evidence and concretely condition the criteria for bringing drugs to market and, more broadly, the political economy of health. The history of the connection between tobacco and lung cancer, from Fisher’s work to the studies by Doll and Hill in the 1950s, illustrates these tensions.

In this sense, the stakes regarding evidence are not only epistemic, but also political. The way health agencies administer evidence determines regulations, and it is often challenging to align knowledge production with regulatory standards (Douglas 2000). The gap between regulatory authorities and the state of biological knowledge is particularly clear in areas such as carcinogenicity, teratogenicity, and endocrine disruptors, for which explanatory models are still under debate.

This line of research therefore seeks to examine current transformations in medical evidence at the interface between the conceptual, methodological, and political aspects, using the tools of historical epistemology. We also examine the historical change in the forms of evidence according to changes in both the epistemic and non-epistemic contexts. 

  1. Disciplinary relations in medicine

The concept of evidence also illustrates the place that medicine plays in the ecosystem of life sciences, as it draws on several fields of biological research using its own set of methods. Canguilhem stresses that medicine, as the art of healthcare, relies on scientific knowledge without ever being limited to it. As such, he argues that medicine cannot be understood as a straightforward application of biological sciences, but rather as an original technique with its own purposes, informed by diverse bodies of knowledge. Reciprocally, medicine itself guides some scientific research by raising new questions within a strictly biological framework. This leads us to think of medicine as a place where disciplines meet and interact, rather than as the straightforward application of a unique body of knowledge, and which also drives the research agenda in biology. Yet contemporary forms of knowledge production tend to closely integrate fundamental and applied research. Similarly, projects are increasingly being conducted in interdisciplinary environments where biology, medicine, computer science, social sciences, and environmental sciences intersect. For example, One Health, which embeds ecology in the analysis of zoonoses, gained particular importance during the Covid-19 pandemic. It illustrates the broadening of the medical perspective beyond the traditional doctor/patient relationship and shows how disciplinary relationships are reshaping the very boundaries of what is defined as a medical issue. It reminds us that the links between disciplines also affect the institutional and political organization of medicine.

 

This use of diverse knowledge for treatment also raises the question of the disciplinary hierarchies it entails. For example, we might consider how medical humanities find their place in research and training structures. Their integration is often marked by power struggles with biomedical disciplines, demonstrating that the balance between different areas of knowledge stems as much from political choices as from scientific evidence. In this context, the tools of historical epistemology provide resources for analyzing the conditions that define the relations between disciplines and the forms of power that shape them.

This line of research seeks to explore how the lens of historical epistemology can provide a better understanding of disciplinary relationships in medicine, in their conceptual, institutional, and political dimensions, as well as questioning and reconfiguring them.

******

These conferences aim to provide an opportunity for philosophers and science historians with varied methodological approaches to meet. They also seek to foster dialogue with representatives from other disciplines in the humanities, social sciences and clinical medicine. Proposals for presentations (max. 500 words, plus a short presentation of the candidate) should be sent to us before 2 March 2026 (response date 7 March) in Word or PDF format to epistemologiehistorique@gmail.com. The two languages of the conference will be French and English.

Ces journées cherchent à être l’occasion d’une rencontre entre philosophes, historien.ne.s des sciences aux options méthodologiques variées. Elles visent aussi à dialoguer avec des représentant.e.s des autres disciplines de sciences humaines et sociales, et de médecine clinique. Les propositions d’interventions (max 500 mots, ainsi qu’une courte présentation du candidat ou de la candidate) sont à nous faire parvenir, avant le 2 mars 2026 (date de réponse le 7 mars), en format word ou pdf à epistemologiehistorique@gmail.com. Les deux langues des journées seront le français et l’anglais.

Keynotes:

Cornelius Borck (Universität zu Lübeck)
Marie-France Mamzer (Université Paris Cité)

Organizing committee:

Caroline Angleraux (associée à l’IHPST)
Lucie Fabry (LIR3S, Université Bourgogne Europe)
Iván Moya-Diez (IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck)
Perceval Pillon (IHPST, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS)
Matteo Vagelli (Université Ca’ Foscari de Venise)

With the support of:

IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck.
IHPST (UMR 8590), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS.
LIR3S (UMR7366),  Université de Bourgogne/CNRS.
MSH Paris Nord (UAR 3258, CNRS/Université Paris 8/USPN).
SCIPLU MSCA2024_0000054, 

 

CFP Intersections of psychological research and psychotherapeutic practices (September 2026)

Call for Papers

Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences

Intersections of psychological research and psychotherapeutic practices

 

Submission deadline: 30 September 2026

This special issue seeks to contribute to the emerging historiography of psychotherapy, focusing on the “Intersections of Psychological Research and Psychotherapeutic Practices.” This topic originates from the 10th International Workshop on Historical Epistemology (University of Lübeck, 2025), which brought together scholars drawing on historical epistemology and related approaches that integrate the philosophy and history of science to analyze how knowledge and therapeutic practices concerning the psyche have been co-constructed across experimental, clinical and cultural contexts.

Within the history of the behavioral and human sciences, psychotherapy has only recently begun to take shape as a distinct object of inquiry in its own right (see, for example, the recent special issues edited by Marks, 2017, 2018; Rosner, 2018; Shamdasani, 2018; and Amouroux, Berger, Jaccard & Aronov, 2023). Earlier historical work on the psy-sciences largely focused on the production of psychological knowledge, often overlooking psychotherapeutic practices. This historical neglect may rest on the assumption that therapeutic practices are either merely applications of psychological knowledge or, conversely, that they lack scientific legitimacy and therefore fall outside the demarcation boundaries of the history of science. In contrast, social and cultural scholars have extensively analyzed the rise and popularization of psychotherapy and other forms of “therapeutic culture,” emphasizing their role in shaping modern subjectivities throughout the twentieth century (e.g., Rose, 1989, 1996; Illouz, 2007, 2008). Yet this literature approaches therapeutic practices primarily as a cultural phenomenon, rarely engaging in detail with the epistemological issues that have shaped them. As a result, much of the existing historiography of psychotherapy has been written by practitioners themselves. Such accounts typically take the form of biographies of pioneers or narratives celebrating the scientific progress of specific schools of therapy, often within a Whiggish framework.

Borrowing from Georges Canguilhem’s (1974) insight that medicine is not merely an application of biological knowledge but a therapeutic art or technique situated at the crossroads of several sciences, we propose to examine similar intersections through which different traditions of psychological research and therapeutic practice have shaped one another across diverse contexts, institutions, and epistemic styles.

Unlike the so-called natural sciences and their material instruments — microscopes, telescopes, or particle accelerators — the psy-sciences may seem to lack the equivalents of Bachelard’s phénoménotechniques. Yet, as Mitchell Ash and Thomas Sturm (2007) have pointed out, psychology relies on a rich array of paper tools — questionnaires, interviews, testing protocols — that structure both research and therapy. Different therapeutic approaches have been developed and legitimized through the use of such paper technologies as well as statistical analyses, experimental designs, clinical trials, diagnostic systems, and psychological concepts, linking clinical work and empirical research. These epistemic instruments and practices not only organize the production of knowledge and therapeutic interventions but also shape the norms and forms of subjectivity that psychotherapy brings into being. The normative effects of psy-practices have been widely discussed since Foucault’s work, for instance in the social analyses of therapeutic culture. Ian Hacking and Arnold Davidson have also examined how epistemic instruments, systems of classification, and other forms of psychological knowledge and practice not only describe but also “make up people,” producing looping effects through the very categories that define them.

Finally, by examining these intertwined epistemic and normative dimensions, this special issue aims to understand the history of psychotherapy as a crossroads of reciprocal production and continual transformation among psychological knowledge, research practices, techniques of the self, social institutions, and modern forms of subjectivity.

Topics for this call for papers include but are not restricted to:

  • Historiographical Methods in the History of Psychotherapy
  • The Emergence of Psychotherapy Research
  • Translating Psychological Research into Therapeutic Practice
  • Experimental Research and Clinical Interventions
  • Clinical Research on Therapeutic Change and Process
  • The History of Outcome Measurement and Therapeutic Efficacy
  • Clinical Trials in Psychotherapy and the Rise of Evidence-Based Practice
  • The Use of Clinical Notes, Reports, Questionnaires, and Other Paper Tools in Clinical Psychology
  • Historical Research on Clinical Materials and Archives of Psychotherapy
  • Epistemic Dimensions of Therapeutic and Self-Help Cultures
  • The Behavioral Sciences, Cognitive Sciences, and Psychotherapy
  • Histories of Different Psychotherapeutic Approaches
  • Psychoanalysis and Epistemic Disputes
  • Training Practices and the Manualization of Psychotherapy
  • The Normative Effects of Psychotherapy
  • Cross-Cultural Transfers and Translations of Psychotherapy Research
  • Psychotherapy as an Epistemic Practice: Knowledge, Intervention, and Reflexivity
  • The Co-Production of Psychological Knowledge and Therapeutic Techniques

 

Guest Editors:

Dr. Caroline Angleraux
The Institute of History and Philosophy of Science and Technology (IHPST)
France

Prof. Lisa Malich
Universität zu Lübeck
Germany

Dr. Ivan Moya-Diez
University of Lübeck,
Germany

Dr. Sarah Marks
Birkbeck University of London
United Kingdom

Keywords: Epistemic Practices in Psychotherapy; Experimental and Clinical Knowledge; History of Psychotherapy; Psychotherapy Research; Therapeutic Culture

annonce de parution | Laurent Loison, Canguilhem philosophe du vital Lire La Connaissance de la vie

Canguilhem philosophe du vitalLaurent Loison

Canguilhem philosophe du vital. Lire La Connaissance de la vie

À paraître en juillet 2025

Vrin – Bibliothèque d’Histoire de la Philosophie – Poche

Présentation

Qu’est-ce qu’un organisme vivant? Comment comprendre la relation entre un être vivant et son milieu? Pourquoi les machines ne tombent-elles pas malades? Et, plus fondamentalement encore, la vie peut-elle être un objet de connaissance? Voilà les questions que pose le philosophe Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) dans un de ses maîtres-livres, La Connaissance de la vie, au fil de sept études qui touchent à la philosophie, à la biologie, à la médecine et à l’histoire des sciences. Les préoccupations de Canguilhem n’ont rien perdu de leur actualité : la crise de la biodiversité, le changement climatique et maintenant la possibilité d’une humanité augmentée s’en font l’écho. La Connaissance de la vie est donc plus que jamais un livre nécessaire. Mais, comme c’est un ouvrage difficile, il fallait en faciliter l’accès. C’est là l’ambition du présent essai.

L’Auteur

Laurent Loison est historien et philosophe des sciences, chercheur au CNRS (SPHERE, UMR 7219).
 

éH10: Intersections of Psychological Research and Psychotherapeutic Practices

 

10th International Workshop on Historical Epistemology

27-29 March 2025

Institut für Medizingeschichte und Wissenschaftsforschung (IMGWF)
Universität zu Lübeck

 

Venue: Lecture Hall (Hörsaal), IMGWF, Königstraße 42, 23552 Lübeck.

Mandatory registration via email at: epistemologiehistorique@gmail.com

 

Thursday, March 27th

14:00 Welcome

14:15 Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, Max-Planck Institute for the History of Science
Opening lecture: My Take on Historical Epistemology. A Personal Note.

15:15 Coffee-break

15:45  Annette C. Mülberger, University of Groningen
How did personality enter the workplace? Discussions on psychotechnics and the ‘human factor’ in the 1920s

16:30 Matthew Perkins-McVey, Bar-Ilan University
On ‘Chemical Tools:’ Intoxicating the ‘Normal and the Pathological’ in the Psy-Sciences

17:15 Ilaria Fornacciari, Masaryk University in Brno (Czech Republic)
Mirroring Mechanical Metaphors: Materials for an Archaeology of “Emotional Competence”, from Asperger to Robot-Assisted Autism Therapy (RAAT)

 

Friday, March 28th

09:30 Catriel Fierro, Autonomous University of Barcelona
‘Yes, well… But does it work?’ Effectivity, Technological Forecast and Phonographic Recording in Carl Rogers’ Psychotherapy Research Program at The Ohio State University (1939-1945)

10:15  Francesca Carta, Ca’ Foscari University
Beck Depression Inventory: from Psychometrics to Therapy

11:00 Coffee-break 

11:30  Iván Moya Diez, IMGWF, University of Lübeck
The cognitive revolution in therapeutic practice: Strategies of scientific rationality and the relative autonomy of cognitive therapy

12:15  Fanny Mertens, University of Leipzig
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy and the Imperative of Speaking Truth. A Social-Philosophical Critique of the Evolutionist Scientism of Behavioural Experiments

13:00 Lunch   

14:00 Philippe Huneman, IHPST, University Paris 1/CNRS
Ancient alienism, modern psychiatry?

14:45 Marion Farge, Marie and Louis Pasteur University
From psychoanalysis to a “new psychological culture”: topicalities of the “Psy-function”

15:30 Coffee-break 

16:00 Sarah Marks, Birkbeck, University of London
CBT in Britain: Welfare, Evidence and NHS Contexts, 1960-2010 (online presentation)          

16:45 Dylan Guével, LIER-FYT, Paris, EHESS-CNRS
“How new practical issues in the reception of patients affect psychiatric knowledge: A pragmatic history of the concept of paranoia in French psychiatry in the 1930s”

17:30 Elodie Gratreau, Université de Technologie de Compiègne
Developing ambiguous classifications for a clinically relevant psychiatric research

 

Saturday, March 29th

09:30 Martin Wieser, Sigmund Freud University Berlin
How to relax in a dictatorship. On the genesis and development of Autogenic Training in Germany

10:15  Antonia Sieler, IMGWF, University of Lübeck
‘Therapy is Change, not Adaptation’- Feminist Therapeutic Practices in the Case of the BIFF (Beratung und Information für Frauen)

11:00 Coffee-break 

11:30 Luc Surjous, Paris Cité University
The relation between science and care in medicine and psychotherapy from the perspective of Georges Canguilhem’s work

12:15 Janu Milella, IMGWF, University of Lübeck
The “Real-Life Test” at the Intersection of Epistemic and Psychotherapeutic Practices in Gender Assessment

13:00 Lunch 

14:00 Wessel de Cock, Humboldt University of Berlin
Towards a Systematic Historical Epistemology. An exemplary case study of the integration of clinical psychology into neuroscientific experimental systems in the 1990s Decade of the Brain

14:45 Grace Smith, Princeton University
Operationalizing grief: Measure-making as a looping technology in psychiatric grief in the U.S., 1975-1995

15:30 Closing remarks

 

Organizing committee:

Caroline Angleraux (iBrain U1253, INSERM de Tours)
Lucie Fabry (LIR3S, Université de Bourgogne)
Lisa Malich (IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck)
Iván Moya-Diez (IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck)
Perceval Pillon (IHPST, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS)
Matteo Vagelli (CFS, Università di Pisa)

This workshop is organized by:

ÉpistHist. Research Network on the History and the Methods of Historical Epistemology

With the support of:

IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck.
IHPST (UMR 8590), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS.
LIR3S (UMR7366),  Université de Bourgogne/CNRS.

This workshop is founded by:

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – Project Number 516932573: “The cognitive revolution in therapeutic practice: adapting scientific ideals and forming subjects in Aaron Beck’s cognitive therapy, 1950-1990.”

 

Dossier “Questions de style”, Revue de Synthèse, 145/3-4 (2024)

Revue de Synthèse, 145/3-4 (2024)


« Questions de style » / “Problems of Style”


 
Ce dossier de la Revue de Synthèse se fait l’écho de la résurgence du concept de style dans la pensée contemporaine. Prenant acte du fait que la réflexion stylistique a aujourd’hui largement débordé le cadre rhétorique, pour s’ouvrir à un questionnement plus global sur les formes de l’expérience humaine, il se propose de donner un aperçu du foisonnement des recherches actuelles sur le style dans une perspective interdisciplinaire. La fécondité théorique du style tient en effet à sa grande plasticité, dont témoignent les contributions ici réunies, qu’elles traitent d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, d’anthropologie, de musique, de littérature ou de jeu vidéo
 
PRÉSENTATION
Rémi Mermet, Le style, encore et toujours/Style, Again and Always, p. 311-323

ARTICLES
Matteo Vagelli­, Styles of Science and the Pluralist Turn: Between Inclusion and Exclusion/Styles scientifiques et le virage pluraliste : entre inclusion et exclusion, p. 325-363

Jules Colmart, La traduction comme style de pensée chez Lévi-Strauss/Translation as a Thought Style in Lévi-Strauss’s Work, p. 365-397

Fériel Kaddour, .« Ce qui seul mérite le nom de style » : Adorno, Beethoven et les bassons de la Cinquième Symphonie/“The True Location of that which Alone Deserves to be Called Style”: Adorno, Beethoven and the Bassoons of the Fifth, p. 399-436

Clara de Courson, Détourner un héritage stylistique. Du bon usage des stylèmes galants dans l’Histoire d’une Grecque moderne de Prévost d’Exiles/Diverting a Stylistic Legacy: On the Proper Use of Gallant Stylistic Features in Prévost d’Exiles’ The Greek Girl’s Story, p. 437-460

Pierre Dernoncourt, L’actualité du style à la lumière des Soulsborne/Style in the Light of the Soulsborne Series, p. 461-495

REVUE CRITIQUE
Cindy Gervolino, Gestes et diagrammes : approches philosophiques, linguistiques et mathématiques, p. 497-504

COMPTES RENDUS
Styles artistiques, styles scientifiques, p. 505-524

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CFP 10th Workshop on Historical Epistemology

Call for Papers
10th International Workshop on Historical Epistemology:
Intersections of Psychological Research and Psychotherapeutic Practices

27-29 March 2025

IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck

Organized by:
EpistHist Research Network on the History and the Methods of Historical Epistemology

Opening lecture:
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger

Ten years ago, the Research Network on the History and Methods of Historical Epistemology, EpistHist, began in Paris with its inaugural workshop on épistémologie historique. These workshops have turned into an annual opportunity to discuss key issues in the history and philosophy of sciences and engage in contemporary methodological debates. By mobilizing historical epistemology as a broad approach, the workshops mediate between 20th-century French epistemology and its recent renewal in the English-speaking world. The abstracts and programs of past editions are available on the research network’s website: https://episthist.hypotheses.org/.

After editions in Paris, Dijon, and Venice, EpistHist is now crossing the Rhine and the Elbe rivers to celebrate its first decade at the Institute for the History of Medicine and Science Studies, University of Lübeck, where Hans-Jörg Rheinberger once conceived tools for interlacing the history of science with philosophy through historical epistemology.

This anniversary workshop will focus on the topic of Intersections of Psychological Research and Psychotherapeutic Practices. Here, we aim to explore which approaches within historical epistemology are most suitable for investigating the production of knowledge and practices related to the psyche.

Since Gaston Bachelard (1984) placed research instruments and techniques at the core of his epistemological history with the concept of phenomenotechnique, the role of practices has become central to understanding the production and transmission of scientific knowledge. Compared to microscopes or particle accelerators, psychology and the psy-sciences might seem to lack equivalent phenomenotechniques. However, at a closer look, the psy-sciences make widespread use of questionnaires, interviews, protocols, and other “paper tools” essential for their knowledge practices. Mitchell Ash and Thomas Sturm (2007), following Ian Hacking (1992) and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger (2017), have especially pointed to the role of instruments of experimentation as organizers of psychological research practices.

On a cultural and political level, following Michel Foucault’s (2008) analysis of psy-practices as disciplinary practices, scholars like Ian Hacking (1995, 1998, 2002), Arnold I. Davidson (2002), and others explored the normative effects of psy-sciences and psy-practices on subjects, subjectivity, and conceptions of selfhood, showing how concepts and categories shape experiences, resulting in new ways of “making up people.”

Nonetheless, with the notable exception of some recent works (Marks, 2017; Rosner, 2018), inquiries into the history of psy-sciences have primarily focused on the production of psy-knowledge, often overlooking psychotherapeutic practices under the assumption that these are merely applications of that knowledge. Our workshop intends to challenge this by explicitly addressing psychotherapeutic practices as equally relevant for a historical epistemology of psy-sciences. We follow Georges Canguilhem’s (1974) insight that medicine is not the mere application of knowledge generated in the life sciences but a set of diagnostic and therapeutic techniques situated at the crossroads of different disciplines and sciences. Borrowing from Canguilhem, the aim of our workshop is precisely to explore such intersections and crossroads, from experimental psychology to spiritual exercises, and from psychiatric classification systems to psychotherapeutic approaches.

We welcome proposals exploring the relationship between scientific inquiries producing knowledge and the technical development of psychotherapeutic practices. Key questions to be addressed include, but are not limited to:

  • What approach within historical epistemology helps to better understand the social, political, and normative effects of psy-practices?
  • What instruments in the psy-field can be conceptualized as “paper tools” or even phenomenotechniques?
  • To what extent and how do categories and concepts from psychotherapy help create new “kinds of people”?
  • How has the relationship between psychological research and psychotherapeutic approaches changed over time?
  • How have specific scientific inquiries shaped different psychotherapeutic practices?
  • Did the scientific knowledge produced by the psy-sciences migrate into psychotherapy, and, if so, how was it translated, transformed, and adapted in the process?
  • In what ways have psychotherapeutic techniques contributed to psychological research?
  • How have different scientific findings been used to legitimize psychotherapeutic practices?
  • What roles have cultural, institutional, and political contexts played in shaping psy-sciences, psychotherapeutic practices, and their interrelations?

Proposals (500 words, along with a brief bio of the candidate) must be submitted by November 30, 2024, in .doc format to epistemologiehistorique@gmail.com. Notification of acceptance or rejection will be sent by early January 2025. The workshop will be conducted in English.

Organizing committee:

Caroline Angleraux (iBrain U1253, INSERM de Tours)
Lucie Fabry (LIR3S, Université de Bourgogne)
Lisa Malich (IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck)
Iván Moya-Diez (IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck)
Perceval Pillon (IHPST, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS)
Matteo Vagelli (CFS, Università di Pisa)

This workshop is founded by:

Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – Project Number 516932573: “The cognitive revolution in therapeutic practice: adapting scientific ideals and forming subjects in Aaron Beck’s cognitive therapy, 1950-1990.”

With the support of:

IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck.
IHPST (UMR 8590), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne/CNRS.
LIR3S (UMR7366),  Université de Bourgogne/CNRS.

[parution] Basaglia. Radikales Denken, optimistisches Handeln (Psychiatrie Verlag)

Was bleibt, wenn aus Radikalität Geschichte wird?

Hundert Jahre liegt der Geburtstag von Franco Basaglia zurück. Der Psychiater aus Norditalien war dort und später weltweit Wortführer einer revolutionär kritischen Bewegung, die nichts weniger als die Überwindung der Anstalten forderte. Wo stehen wir jetzt und was ist von Basaglia geblieben?

Viele Gedanken und Ansätze, die die europäischen Reformbewegungen der 1968er hervorbrachten, sind heute entweder im täglichen Arbeitsleben eingehegt worden oder aber vergessen. Ein Mensch, der so prägend für unser Verständnis von sozialem Miteinander und Teilhabe war, verdient nun mehr als ein bloßes Auftauchen aus den Wogen der Geschichte. Basaglias Erbe steht für den Dreiklang aus Praxis, kritischer Theoriebildung und Utopie: Dies ist der Kern jeder Kreativität und Erneuerung.
In den gesammelten Worten, sowohl seinen eigenen als auch der nachfolgenden Generation, zieht eine vielstimmige und multidisziplinäre Gruppe von Autorinnen und Autoren aus Italien und Deutschland ein Zwischenfazit: Haben sich die Konflikte der Vergangenheit wirklich aufgelöst oder nur ihre Form geändert?  Wie positionieren sich die psychiatrischen Dienste (oder wir uns) in einer sich wandelnden Gesellschaft und stehen wir wieder am Anfang der Erneuerung der Psychiatrie?

Autorin Kirsten Düsberg

Kirsten Düsberg, ist Soziologin, lebt in Udine und hat an grenzüberschreitenden Projekten zur Geschichte und Gegenwart der Psychiatrie mitgewirkt.

Autorin Luciana Degano Kieser

Luciana Degano Kieser ist Ärztin für Psychiatrie, Master of Public Health, und in Italien und Deutschland tätig.

Autor Jörg Utschakowski

Jörg Utschakowski ist Diplom-Sozialarbeiter und Psychiatriereferent des Landes Bremen. Er initiierte und koordinierte das EU-Projekt EX-IN und ist im Bundesvorstand des Vereins EX-IN Deutschland.

Reconsidering Historical Epistemology. French and Anglophone Styles in History and Philosophy of Science – Matteo Vagelli (Springer 2024)

“Vagelli’s book provides a both unique and uniquely important window into historical epistemology and its relation to contemporary philosophy of science. Unique because nowhere else can one find a single work that treats the range of topics that he covers. Uniquely important because Vagelli’s clear, concise, and comprehensive survey details key interrelationships among a range of American, British, and European views currently in play regarding historical epistemology and philosophy of science as well as the institutional and intellectual vectors driving their associated epistemological positions.”

(Paul Roth, University of California-Santa Cruz)

About this book:

This book explores the key conceptual stakes underpinning historical epistemology. The strong Anglophone interest in historical epistemology, since at least the 1990s, is typically attributed to its simultaneously philosophical and historical synthetic approach to the study of science. Yet this account, considered by critics to be an unreflective assumption, has prevented historical epistemology from developing a clear understanding and definition, especially regarding how precisely historical and philosophical reflections on the sciences should be combined. Thus, this book uniquely analyses how the problems and tensions inherent to the “contemporary” phase of historical epistemology can be clarified by reference to the “classical” French phase. The archaeological method of Michel Foucault, which draws on and transforms fundamental insights by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, is used to exert an enduring influence on the field—especially through the work of Ian Hacking and his philosophical cum historical analyses of “styles of scientific reasoning”. Though this book is of great value to academic specialists and graduate students, the fact it addresses questions broad in scope ensures it is also relevant to a range of scholars in many disciplines and will provoke discussion among those interested in foundational issues in history and philosophy of science.

Keywords

Table of contents (9 chapters)

The Historical Epistemology of Scientific Styles

9th International Workshop on Historical Epistemology

27-28 June – Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia

↓ ABSTRACTS available below ↓

JUNE 27, 2024 (Sala Morelli) 

9:00 Welcome

9:15 Guillermo Cimbora Acosta, Universidad de Sevilla

Denkstil, self-vindication, and the dialectic of experimental practices.

10:00 Stefano Pilotto, Sapienza Università di Roma

Thinking by tools. Observations on a “technical style” in history of science

11:15 Luca Sciortino, Ecampus University

Styles of reasoning and the demarcation problem 

12:00 Sofia Abelha, Universität Wien

What is new about anti-exceptionalism about logic?

15:00 Eleonora Montuschi, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia

Styles of scientific practice: the case of citizen science

15:45 Luis F. Bartolo Alegre, LMU München

Is logic a style of reasoning?

17:00 Ben Toth, CFCUL Lisbon

The summer of theory. Crombie and Foucault, styles and fields

 

JUNE 28, 2024 (Aula Baratto)

9:30 Antoine Auvé, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Style and personality in Dilthey’s epistemology: from the method of the historian to the historiography of the emergence of modern science

10:15 Paolo Babbiotti, Università di Torino

Two stylistics methods for “the problem of style” in philosophy. Compression and lingering (in Bernard Williams and Stanley Cavell) 

11:30 Aurore Franco-Ricord, IHPST Paris

Scientific styles and cultures struggles: the case of endosymbiotic theory

12:15 Caroline Angleraux, INSERM Tours

Styles and desuetude: the case study of Haeckel’s monera

15:00 Julia Reed, Bar-Ilan University

Scientific styles of making and re-making sex

15:45 Matteo Pasquinelli, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia

Three styles of AI: induction, vectorialisation, and modelling 

17:00 Johannes Endres, University of California Riverside

Style and epistemology: basic strictures, and open questions

 

This workshop is organized by:

Épistémologie Historique. Research Network on the History and the Methods of Historical Epistemology

With the support of: 

Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Dipartimento di Filosofia e Beni Culturali;

IHPST (UMR 8590, Paris 1/CNRS);

Université de Bourgogne, LIR3S (UMR 7366 CNRS-uB)

IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck


Organizing committee:

Caroline Angleraux (iBrain U1253, INSERM de Tours)
Lucie Fabry (Université de Bourgogne, LIR3S)
Iván Moya-Diez (IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck)

Perceval Pillon (IHPST)

Matteo Vagelli (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia)

Further information: epistemologiehistorique@gmail.com

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

ABSTRACTS

JUNE 27, 2024 (Sala Morelli) 

9:00 Welcome

9:15 Guillermo Cimbora Acosta, Universidad de Sevilla

Denkstil, self-vindication, and the dialectic of experimental practices.

In the last works of Ian Hacking, the name Ludwik Fleck began to appear with some frequency. In ‘Styles for Historians and Philosophers’, Hacking refers to Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact as the most famous instance of the idea of thought style before Crombie’s work. The fact that Hacking and Fleck coincide in their use of the notion of thought style is not coincidental, as both share the project of characterizing the objectivity attributed to scientific knowledge abandoning the theory of truth by correspondence and taking material interaction with the world as fundamental. However, besides affirming that the scope he gives to the notion of style is considerably broader than Fleck’s, we do not find many more connections between the thinking of both authors in Hacking’s published works. The aim of our presentation is to establish such connections, by interpreting Fleck from the perspective of the philosophy of scientific practices. To do so, firstly, we will show how the notion of thought style in Fleck’s work has variable scope, allowing him to speak both of the thought style of modern science or theology and of the thought style of the much more particular collective of serologists. Secondly, we will point out that in Hacking’s thought we also find two types of units of analysis with very different scopes: styles of scientific thinking, based on the self-authentication thesis, and laboratory sciences, based on the self-vindication thesis. Thirdly, we will propose to connect the proposals of both authors following the idea of Hacking’s laboratory sciences, rather than that of styles of scientific thinking. The justification for this change in the terms of the comparison is that, beyond merely pointing out the phenomenon of incommensurability, that Hacking labeled as dissociation between distant thought styles (e.g., Theology vs. Physics), Fleck’s philosophical work is dedicated to analyzing the practice of experimental sciences. In this context, Fleck proposes his triadic notion of cognition, characterized as a dialectic between active and passive elements of knowledge —adopted later by Andrew Pickering for his philosophy of scientific practices. This dialectic will allow us, finally, to establish a direct and an indirect comparison between the philosophies of Fleck and Hacking. The direct comparison will be made between Fleck’s triadic notion of cognition and Hacking’s thesis of laboratory sciences’ self-vindication, while the indirect comparison will be established between this same thesis and the pragmatic realism advocated by Pickering, which is grounded on Fleck’s dialectic between active and passive elements of knowledge.

 

10:00 Stefano Pilotto, Sapienza Università di Roma

Thinking by tools. Observations on a “technical style” in history of science

The great historian of science Alexandre Koyré, in his article dedicated to philosophers and machines, articulates the relationship between knowledge (épisteme) and technique (téchne) by admitting the historical precedence of the latter, and “since these rules [that guide technique] do not fall from the sky,” he states that “we are forced to admit an independent origin of technique, and therefore the existence of technical thought”. What Koyré postulates is the existence of a practical thought, which is essentially different from theoretical thought.
This contribution aims to critically analyse Koyré’s thesis, by considering technique as an original practice and not an application of the scientific practice or necessarily correlated to it. Therefore, in order to understand if what Koyré calls “technical thinking” can be considered an autonomous style, we will show the difference between his position and the notion of laboratory style theorised by Ian Hacking, so as to distinguish between the instrumental endowment of experimental research and its non-formalised material conditions of possibility.
In this analysis we will compare Koyré’s position to those of French historical epistemology, in particular to Canguilhem’s theses on the relationship between science and technique. Lastly, we will focus on the peculiarities of this possible style, which directs the thought by offering a modality of instrumental understanding (B. Irrgang), which can also provide heuristic analogies useful for scientific knowledge.

11:15 Luca Sciortino, Ecampus University

Styles of reasoning and the demarcation problem 

The problem of how to develop a coherent distinction between science and non-science has been extensively discussed since the beginning of the twentieth century. However, most of the proposed solutions were attempts to identify necessary and sufficient conditions that failed to take into account the complexity of scientific enterprise and that did not contemplate the existence of different degrees of scientificity. In the 1990s, Ian Hacking was one of the philosophers who observed that there might be no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for being a science and no set of features possessed by all the sciences. Nevertheless, he maintained that it is possible to distinguish between humanistic and scientific styles of reasoning — only the latter have developed what he called techniques of self-authentication.
Since Hacking did not develop these ideas further, he left many problems unsolved. For example, it is still open to question whether the authentication techniques are really peculiar only to the scientific thought; it is unclear which features are not possessed by all the sciences; and it is uncertain whether some styles of reasoning can be considered ‘more scientific’ than others rather than ‘scientific’ or ‘non-scientific’ tout court. Yet, discussing the boundaries between science and non-science, by focusing on styles of reasoning as a unity of analysis, seems a perspective worth exploring. This is the task I shall undertake in this talk.
To start with, it will be crucial to characterize the concept of ‘styles of reasoning’: which ways of thinking can be counted as ‘styles of reasoning’ in the sense of Hacking? I shall frame this issue within the ‘theory of prototypes’, a view of categorization that rests on Wittgenstein’s idea of “family resemblances”. According to this view, concepts are not categories defined by the common properties of its members but categories represented by best examples (prototypes). I shall summarise the fundamental theses of Hacking’s styles project and identify a set of properties of the statistical style of reasoning. Then, I shall show that there is no clear boundary to the category of styles of reasoning and that degrees of category membership for a given way of thinking are determined by its degree of similarity to a ‘prototype’ (e.g. the statistical style of reasoning). I shall also illustrate this result by showing the ‘diagram of the category of styles of reasoning’ in which different members belong to different concentric circles. The algorithmic, the postulational, the statistical, the taxonomic, the historico-genetic and the laboratory styles of reasoning will occupy the innermost circle of the ‘best examples’ or prototypes.
Furthermore, I shall argue that the effectiveness of the techniques of self-authentication and the degree of progressiveness (delivering new predictions, ‘objects’, classifications etc.) increase moving from the periphery towards the innermost circle. Finally, I shall argue that the more scientific a style is the more it is attracted towards the center of the diagram, i.e. the more properties it shares with the prototypes, the central core of scientific thought. Ultimately, there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions for being a scientific style. Styles of reasoning differ in ‘scientificity’ as a function of the number of properties of the prototypes they possess. While a style may be less scientific than a prototype, it may not be more or less scientific than another style.

 

12:00 Sofia Abelha, Universität Wien

What is new about anti-exceptionalism about logic?

Interest in how logic intersects with science in terms of its methodology, epistemology, metaphysics, and even its values has attracted considerable attention in recent philosophy of logic literature, often discussed under the label of anti-exceptionalism about logic (hereafter AEL). The opposing traditional perspective to it is initially associated with Kant’s characterization of synthetic a priori knowledge, but also interestingly widespread in common sense through the idea that logic is the cornerstone of objectivity and certainty. From this perspective, logic is taken as a foundational discipline rooted in necessary and analytic truths, relying on a priori evidence, such as rational intuition, and possessing a distinct methodology from other scientific disciplines. AEL emerges as an attempt to overcome the shortcomings of this view in explaining the plurality and revisability of logics and, importantly, in rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction, following Quine (1980). Hence, the new concerns include how to rationally justify a choice between different logical theories or even the adoption of logical laws, how to explain logical knowledge as fallible and revisable and how to determine which is the relevant kind of data responsible for informing and regulating these theories.

A plausible way to characterize the general picture, as done by Martin & Hjortland (2022), is by identifying two main approaches to AEL: as continuity with the empirical sciences or as tradition rejection. Albeit they quickly dismiss the first alternative, it aims at exploring the similarities between logic and science in order to gain understanding over logical knowledge, for instance by comparing logics to scientific models via a logic-as-modelling view. The second approach is more comprehensive in that it is a negative thesis which consists in denying at least one of the traditional properties attributed to logic, including but not limited to generality, formality, foundationalism, apriority, analyticity, necessity and normativity. In either case the conventional position of logic as a privileged field in terms of its epistemology, methodology, and metaphysics is challenged.

But the pursuit and development of a scientifically oriented philosophy is far from new, dating at least back to the late 19th century and being distinctively promoted by the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle in the early and mid-20th century. Despite emerging from different social, political, economic, and cultural backgrounds, these movements share similar motivations and aspirations, which is made clear by anti-exceptionalists when tracing the origins of the discussion back to Quine’s (1953) empirical holism. The influence I want to recover from that period is of Pragmatism, so that a new approach to the exceptionality of logic can be put forward without incurring into the same problematic anti-metaphysical, non-cognitivist and semantic reductionist aspects of logical empiricism. I shall point out the lessons we should take from this aged discussion and propose a deflationist approach where the notion of ’truth’ and ’correctness’, that often appear to characterize theory choice and to justify logical principles, can be cashed out without implying logical realism nor monism. The main features I want to preserve are of a revisable, fallible and non-foundational perspective on logic.

 

15:00 Eleonora Montuschi, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia

Styles of scientific practice: the case of citizen science

The concept of style is useful both to describe how science ‘gets done’ and more generally to understand science as a scientific practice. In the light of this, in this talk I will question whether and how a particular way of ‘doing science’ – i.e. citizen science – can qualify itself as a style of research, and whether there is any added (epistemological or other) value to describe it this way.

15:45 Luis F. Bartolo Alegre, LMU München

Is logic a style of reasoning?

From the beginning of the styles of reasoning project, Hacking excluded logic from it. He contends that ‘styles of reasoning create the possibility for truth and falsehood’, whereas logic ‘merely preserve[s] it’ [7, p. 57]. For him, logic doesn’t generate new possibilities for establishing truth, which is what proper styles of thinking do, but rather facilitates the transition from one set of truths to another. Thirty years later, Hacking further argued ‘logic is topic-neutral in a way that styles of thinking & doing are not’, and that it can be applied universally in conversations and that arguing is a universal practice [10, p. 601-2]. Styles of thinking, instead, are more context-specific, particularly prevalent in scientific discourse but not uniformly present across cultures or historical periods.
In this talk, I’ll contend that, within Hacking’s framework, logic could indeed be classified as a style of reasoning. There are at least three reasons to argue this.
First, although ‘people everywhere make inductions, draw inferences to best explanation, make deductions’ [9, p. 12], there was no systematic treatment of arguments before Aristotle’s theory of syllogism [1]. This theory proposed a way of thinking in which we could systematically relate statements in terms of mutual exclusion, exhaustivity, necessary and sufficient conditions, etc. Moreover, there’s a debate on whether standard logic really captures the way of reasoning in other cultures or even in informal settings [cf. 6,11,12,13,18].
Second, Aristotle’s laws of syllogism were not final in the development of this discipline. Not only we had further developments of logic beyond the theory of syllogism – which at best could be compared with modern one-place predicate logic. Aristotle’s rules don’t completely agree with those of modern standard logic [cf. 3,5,17,19,21]. The crystallisation of logic in standard or classical logic meant expanding and even discarding some of Aristotle’s original theses. On the one hand, he didn’t subscribe to the principle of explosion: A,¬AB (Analytica Priora II, 63b32–39), which is featured in any standard introduction to logic. On the other hand, one of his theses is excluded from standard logic, i.e., Aristotle’s thesis: ¬(A→¬A) (Analytica Priora II, 57b3–10). Even today, logic keeps evolving and there are competing theories on what the laws of logic are: so-called non-standard or non-classical logic systems. We have, for instance, paraconsistent logics (in which the principle of explosion isn’t valid in general) and connexive logics (in which Aristotle’s thesis is valid in general).
Finally, it’s nowadays contentious to assert that logic is topic-neutral. For some authors, the existence of non-classical logics suggests that some logic systems are applicable only to specific topics [e.g. 2]. Moreover, it also seems that logic isn’t necessarily used in all (scientific) contexts. For instance, it’s difficult to argue that logic is used in the context of discovery, as sometimes serendipity or creative thinking proceeds without any need of logic. We use logic later to make sure that our conjectures are coherent. Furthermore, we know that there’s inconsistent data and theories in science [cf. 14,15], which means that the laws of explosion or non-contradiction aren’t fully satisfied by science. Some authors have argued from this that the logic used in science is paraconsistent [e.g. 4]. Others, however, have argued that not all principles of logic are used in every scientific context [20].
This seems compatible with stating that logic, as a systematic discipline, created ‘a new kind of object’ [8, p. 148]: systematic theories of the world, all of whose statements are deductively connected. It might be suggested that the logical style put these kinds of theories in the realm of the bivalent, in Hacking’s terms. We must note here that this systematic understanding of scientific theories isn’t general neither of scientific practice nor of our philosophical conceptions of scientific theories. Even within the Vienna Circle, the argument was made that, even if logic is a general and universal theory, not all scientific theories need to be systematic [16].


References
[1] Aristotle. Organon. Testo greco a fronte. Ed. by Maurizio Migliori. Trans. by Lucia Palpacelli. Milano: Bompiani, 2016.
[2] Otávio Bueno and Scott A. Shalkowski. “Modalism and Logical Pluralism”. In: Mind 118.470 (Apr. 2009), pp. 295–321. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzp033.
[3] Newton Carneiro Affonso da Costa and Otávio Bueno. “Paraconsistència: Esboço de uma interpretação”. In: Newton Carneiro Affonso da Costa, Jean-Yves Béziau and Otávio Bueno. Elementos da Teoria Paraconsistente de Conjuntos. Campinas: CLE, 1998, pp. 113–50.
[4] Newton Carneiro Affonso da Costa and Steven French. “Inconsistency in Science. A Partial Perspective”. In: Inconsistency in Science. Ed. by Joke Meheus. Origins: Studies in the Sources of Scientific Creativity 2. Dordrecht: Springer, 2002, pp. 105–18. doi: 10. 1007/978-94-017-0085-6_6.
[5] Evandro Luís Gomes and Itala M. L. D’Ottaviano. “Aristotle’s Theory of Deduction and Paraconsistency”. forthcoming.
[6] Iván Guzmán de Rojas. Logical and Linguistic Problems of Social Communication with the Aymara People. Manuscript Reports 66e. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1985. url: http://hdl. handle.net/10625/7993.
[7] Ian Hacking. “Language, truth and reason”. In: Rationality and Relativism. Ed. by Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1982, pp. 48–66.
[8] Ian Hacking. “Statistical language, statistical truth, and statistical reason: The self-authentification of a style of scientific reasoning”. In: The Social Dimensions of Science. Ed. by Ernan McMullin. Studies in science and the humanities form the Reilly Center for Science, Technology, and Values III. Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, pp. 130–157.
[9] Ian Hacking. “‘Style’ for historians and philosophers”. In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 23.1 (1992), pp. 1–20. doi: 10.1016/0039-3681(92)90024-Z.
[10] Ian Hacking. “‘Language, truth and reason’ 30 years later”. In: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A 43.4 (2012). Special Issue: Styles of Thinking, pp. 599–609. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.07.002.
[11] James F. Hamill. Ethno-logic. The Anthropology of Human Reasoning. Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1990.
[12] Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. La mentalité primitive. The Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford, 29 May 1931. Oxford: Clarendon, 1931.
[13] Lucien Lévy-Bruhl. Les fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures. Paris: PUF, 1951.
[14] María del Rosario Martínez-Ordaz and Luis Estrada-González, eds. Humana.Mente. Journal of Philosophical Studies 10.32 (Aug. 2017): Beyond Toleration? Inconsistency and Pluralism in the Empirical Sciences. url: http://humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/issue/view/ 22.
[15] Joke Meheus, ed. Inconsistency in Science. Origins: Studies in the Sources of Scientific Creativity 2. Dordrecht: Springer, 2002. isbn: 9789401700856. doi: 10.1007/978-94-017-0085-6.
[16] Otto Neurath. “Pseudorationalismus der Falsifikation”. In: Erkenntnis 5.1 (1st Dec. 1935), pp. 353–65. doi: 10.1007/BF00172326.
[17] Graham Priest. “Paraconsistency and dialetheism”. In: The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic Turn in Logic. Ed. by Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods. Vol. 8. Handbook of the History of Logic. North-Holland, 2007, pp. 129–204. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1874-5857(07)80006-9.
[18] Graham Priest. “The Logic of the Catuskoti”. In: Comparative Philosophy 1.2 (2010), pp. 24–51. doi: 10.31979/2151-6014(2010).010206.
[19] Graham Priest and Richard Routley. “Introduction: Paraconsistent logics”. In: Studia Logica 43 (1–2 Mar. 1984): Paraconsistent Logics. Publication dedicated to Ayda I. Arruda. Ed. by Graham Priest and Richard Routley, pp. 3–16. doi: 10.1007/BF00935736.
[20] Peter Vickers. Understanding Inconsistent Science. Dordrecht: Oxford University Press, 2013.
[21] Heinrich Wansing. “Connexive Logic”. In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2023). Ed. by Edward N. Zalta. url: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2023/entries/logicconnexive.

 

17:00 Ben Toth, CFCUL Lisbon

The summer of theory. Crombie and Foucault, styles and fields


In this proposed paper I describe the limitations of style as an explanatory category in science studies. I outline an alternative, Foucault’s archaeological method and argue that it covers the same ground as AC Crombie’s intellectual commitments, but in a more systematic way.

The six categories of scientific method set out in Crombie’s Styles of Scientific Thinking were not novel, but the claim that they represented persistent styles of thought offered a new, historically informed, philosophy of science (Crombie 1994). Crombie’s advocacy of style rested on what he called three intellectual commitments – three capacities of style to facilitate intellectual enquiry over the long run. The first was its capacity to interface between man and nature; the second was its capacity to guide enquiry and warrant findings; and the third was the capacity to provide a psychological and social disposition to stabilise a field of enquiry.
Crombie’s work was endorsed by Ian Hacking in his “styles project”. In an age of what Hacking saw as narrowly focussed studies he praised the ambition of Crombie’s programme. Stylistics Hacking wrote “covers the waterfront and provides a directory …in a readily recognisable and fairly satisfactory way” (Hacking 2012)
As this quotation suggests, Hacking’s endorsement was partial. Modifying Crombie, Hacking christened his approach styles of reasoning rather than Crombie’s styles of thinking, and focussed on the capacity of styles to produce objective knowledge. In doing so Hacking presented style as the central element of a Foucaultian episteme – “for Hacking” wrote Sciortino, “of all the elements that characterise an episteme, eg. assumptions, unspoken truths, institutions, knowledges, social activities, the material traces left behind by a particular epoch, what really counts in order to understand the emergence of new true-or-false statements is what he calls the ‘style of reasoning’. (Sciortino 2024:155)
As (Kusch 2010) describes, Hacking’s work on styles developed and moved on from Crombie. But the validity of the central concept – style – remained somewhat unexamined.
The connotations of the word style – something both humanly fashioned and open to change – give it an appealing diffuse resonance for science studies. The claim I will make in this paper is that style – whether a style of thinking or a style of reasoning – is not a sufficiently original category to underpin the intellectual commitments in the projects of Crombie or Hacking, or more generally of historical epistemology or science studies.
Starting with Foucault’s refusal, in Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1969) to accept style as a category of analysis, I will examine the limitations of style as a category of intellectual enquiry. I will argue that:

1 The Archaeology has been relatively overlooked because the concept of episteme in Order of Things (Foucault 1966) is more amenable to the sort of periodisation seen in historical epistemology, and because Foucault’s later work is more intuitively appealing.
2 The methodology set out in Archaeology remains relevant to science studies, as (Kusch 1991) argued.
3 The method it proposes addresses the intellectual commitments Crombie sought from his styles project, but that a discursive field is a more appealing starting point for historical epistemology and science studies than a style of either thinking or reasoning.


References
Crombie, A. C. (1994). Styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition (3 vols.). Duckworth.
Foucault, M. (1966) Les mots et les choses. Gallimard. Trans. The order of things. Tavistock 1970.
Foucault, M. (1969) L’archéologie du savoir. Gallimard. Trans. The archaeology of knowledge.Tavistock 1972.
Hacking, I. (1994). Styles of scientific thinking or reasoning: a new analytical tool for historians and philosophers of the sciences. In: Gavroglu, K. et al (eds) Trends in the historiography of science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 151. Springer, Dordrecht.
Hacking, I. (2012) ‘Language, Truth and Reason’ 30 years later. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A,Volume 43: 599-609.
Kusch, M. (1991) Foucault’s strata and fields. Springer (Synthese Library).
Kusch, M. (2010) Hacking’s historical epistemology: a critique of styles of reasoning. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41: 158–173.
Sciortino, L. (2024) History of rationalities. Ways of thinking from Vico to Hacking and beyond. Palgrave Macmillan.


JUNE 28, 2024 (Aula Baratto)

9:30 Antoine Auvé, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne

Style and personality in Dilthey’s epistemology: from the method of the historian to the historiography of the emergence of modern science

The figure and thought of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) seem relevant for an investigation of the notion of “scientific style(s)” in the perspective of historical epistemology. Recent Dilthey-scholarship has notably been linking his “Geisteswissenschaften” epistemology to the contemporary current of historical epistemology (Hamid 2016, Campe 2023, though the depiction of Dilthey as a forerunner of Foucault had already been suggested, e.g. Kremer-Marietti 1970), to the point of reviving a “Dilthey-project” (Hartung 2023). We can find in Dilthey an investigation of the specific difference between scientific styles understood as specific methodological approaches, the most general distinction being between sciences of nature and sciences of history. Arguably, “explanation” and “understanding” correspond to different scientific styles and even characters, or put in other words, different approaches amount to different epistemic profiles of the individual researchers/scientists.
Yet, Dilthey’s work could seem at first to be undermined by such a reference to these two correlated concepts of “style” and “personality”. Indeed, Dilthey is heir to the German historicist tradition (Beiser 2011) and to the idea of personal intuition and richness of inner experience as exclusively being the main characteristics of the procedures of the historian, as can be found J. G. Droysen (Droysen 1977) and as is also championed in H. von Helmholtz’ ascription of “artistic induction” to the Geisteswissenschaften (Helmholtz 2017). And indeed many of Dilthey’s works that could be seen as an anticipation of historical epistemology take the form of monographs, of detailed era-picturing or of biographies. More generally, the way Dilthey held the style of a Carlyle to be complementary to the “pure fact”-motto of a historian like L. v. Ranke (Dilthey 1927) seems to bespeak for the concept of “style” as being indigenous to the domain of history, thus coining an only regional association of cognitive, hermeneutical-critical and aesthetic processes (Makkreel 1968).
We would nevertheless wish to unfold the deeper connection between these two aspects, namely the general distinction of respective epistemic styles i.e. methods of natural and historical sciences on the one hand and the specific historiographical style of monographs and biographies that displays Dilthey’s contribution to the history of sciences during the Renaissance and the Classical Age (Dilthey 1914) on the other hand. The historiographical style then serves as a device to depict the crucial epistemic status of personality and style of both naturalists and humanists at the beginning of the Modern Age. Dilthey extends the “style/personality of scientist” framework to encompass the broader concern of the emergence of modern science as a whole. The condition of emergence of modern (now including the natural) sciences, would precisely be the new figure of the scientist and humanist as a highly idiosyncratic and stylized individual, thus establishing a close connection between biographical portraits of scientists/humanists and studying an épistémè as conditioning the institution of new scientific objects and domains (the main one being, precisely, that of “nature” and “humanities”). The category of “style” would thus also be highly relevant to challenge to problem of the “incarnation” of the epistemic hegemony of natural sciences in the new figure of the natural scientist (Dilthey 1982).
 


References.
Beiser, F.C., 2011,  The German historicist tradition, Oxford University Press.
Campe, R., 2023, “Humanities nach den Geisteswissenschaften”, Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 97:23–32.
Dilthey, W., 1891-1904 [1914], Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reformation, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 2, hrsg. von Misch, G., Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht in Göttingen.
id., 1910 [1927], Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften, Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 7, hrsg. von Groethuysen, B..
id., ca. 1870-1895 [1982], Grundlegung der Wissenschaften vom Menschen, der Gesellschaft und der Geschichte. Ausarbeitungen und Entwürfe zum Zweiten Band der Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften (ca. 1870 – 1895), Gesammelte Schriften Bd. 19, hrsg. von Johach, H., und Rodi, F..
Droysen, J.G., 1857 [1977], Historik, Historisch-kritische Ausgabe, Bd. 1, hrsg. Von Blanke, H.W., und Leygh, P., Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt.
Hamid, N., 2016, “Dilthey on the unity of science”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 25:4, 635-656.
Hartung, G., 2023, “Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung und die Idee der Geistesgeschichte – das Dilthey-Projekt”, Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 97, 95–104.
von Helmhotlz, H., 1862 [2017], “Ueber das Verhältnis der Naturwissenschaften zur Gesammtheit der Wissenschaft. Akademische Festrede gehalten zu Heidelberg beim Antritt des Prorectorates”, Philosophische und populärwissenschaftliche Schriften, Bd. 1, hrsg. von Heidelberger, M., Helmut, P., und Schiemann, G., Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 181-207.
Kremer-Marietti, A., 1970,  “La méthodologie de Dilthey”, Revue Philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger, PUF, °160, 423-444.
Makkreel, R.A., 1968, “Toward a Concept of Style: An Interpretation of Wilhelm Dilthey’s Psycho-Historical Account of the Imagination”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 27:2, 171-182.

 

10:15 Paolo Babbiotti, Università di Torino

Two stylistics methods for “the problem of style” in philosophy. Compression and lingering (in Bernard Williams and Stanley Cavell) 

In my presentation I will focus on what I call Cavell and Williams’s “stylistic methods”, namely “lingering” and “compression”. I have dealt in more detail with various aspects related to compression in Williams and the art of lingering in Cavell, respectively, in “Compression. Nietzsche, Williams, and the Problem of Style” (European Journal of Philosophy, 2021) and “Lingering. Wittgenstein, Cavell, and the Problem of Style” (Philosophy and Literature, 2023). When I speak of stylistic method, I mean the systematic use of a writing style to achieve philosophical purposes. In particular, the philosophical purpose that I will investigate in Cavell and Williams is maximal: to show that style matters in philosophy. This is why, emphatically, I will speak of “the problem of style” (and not just one problem among others). The stylistic methods found and cultivated by Cavell and Williams in their writing constitute an argument in favour of stylistic awareness — against those who believe that “in philosophy one has to get it right first, and then add the style afterwards”. This dictum, common to certain analytical philosophers, was efficiently criticised by Bernard Williams when he wrote that: “One should not approach philosophical writing in the spirit of the analytic philosopher who (in actual fact) said to another when they were trying to write a book together, ‘Let’s get it right first and you can put the style in afterwards’”. On this metaphilosophical point both Stanley Cavell and Bernard Williams agree. However, their stylistic methods, while sharing a common intent, turned out to be very different, even opposite, in their realisation: Williams preferred to cultivate concise, pungent and allusive (i.e. compressed) writing; whereas Cavell preferred to cultivate digressive, reflective and intimate (i.e. lingering) writing.

11:30 Aurore Franco-Ricord, IHPST Paris

Scientific styles and cultures struggles: the case of endosymbiotic theory

In 1967, Margulis published the article that was to transform the field of evolutionary science: On the origin of mitosing cells. Presenting the phenomenon of endoymbiosis as an explanation for the appearance of eukaryotic cells, the article received a mixed reception, being rejected by ten or so journals the year before its publication and discussed over the following two decades, and its impact was assessed as being less than hoped (Sagan 2016). For Margulis, the assertion of a constitutive relationality of cellular identity is confronted with the casual rejection of biologists, their reluctance to the idea that the study of communities should provide more theoretical and ontological advances on evolution than that of isolated organisms. However, a historical epistemology reveals a balance of power between different scientific styles, from which derives a hierarchy of evidence structuring the field of evolutionary science: a dominant style – the genetic style presenting evidence of probability based on calculation – and marginal styles, including Margulis’ style – the cytological style presenting plausible evidence based on observation and cytology. This difference in styles, which is both rich – in the form of scientific pluralism – and difficult – in the form of controversies between scientists in the evolutionary sciences – seems to shape and condition a certain number of ontological presuppositions, which explain a certain form of scientific resistance to endosymbiotic theory: opposing the probable to the plausible, the ordinary to the extraordinary, the irreducible to the relational, or the determined to the contingent. I propose to draw up a historical epistemology of the concept of endosymbiosis at several points in its history, from 1967 to the present day. At the time of its publication, based on the balance of power between different scientific styles and cultures, the epistemological inadequacy of cytological observations as sufficient and therefore valid evidence reflects the construction of a field dominated by the genetic sciences, inherited from the modern synthesis. This will lead us to reflect on the broader ontological conceptions that arise from this and make the dynamics of the evolutionary sciences conflicting, in particular through the more traditional conception of the history of evolution informed by a genealogical conception (Angelini, 2023). Finally, we will examine the more contemporary opposition of two models derived from eukaryogenesis: exogenous and endogenous, within which a reaffirmation of this ‘conflict of styles’ is emerging on the one hand, opposing cell biology and biochemistry, and presenting the constitutive relationality for the former and a relativisation of this relationality for the latter (O’Malley, 2010).

12:15 Caroline Angleraux, INSERM Tours

Styles and desuetude: the case study of Haeckel’s monera

 

15:00 Julia Reed, Bar-Ilan University

Scientific styles of making and re-making sex

After the publication of Thomas Laqueur’s Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud (1990), historians of medicine and gender critiqued his argument that the “two-sex body” of sex difference in Western science and medicine emerged at the end of the eighteenth century (circa 1800) to replace the older “one-sex body.” Before the beginning of the nineteenth century, according to Laqueur, “there was only one sex to pick from” in Western medicine; every human body was more or less male due to complexional heat. Katharine Park’s recent expanded critique of Laqueur in Isis gives new urgency and inspiration to the historical study of human sex difference and determination. According to Park, the “one-sex body” was a relatively specific and short-lived scientific object in medicine that developed in late medieval and early modern Latin surgical texts and then migrated out of learned medicine into European vernaculars in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

This paper, “Scientific Styles of Making and Re-Making Sex,” investigates the uses and limitations of the notion of scientific styles for historicizing human sex difference and determination, focusing on the scholarly debates concerning the “one-sex body” and the “two-sex body.” First, I ask how understanding the history of the “one-sex body” and the “two-sex body” in late medieval and early modern medicine might be framed as the overlap and interaction of specific styles discussed by Crombie and Hacking—the experimental, hypothetical modeling, and the taxonomic. Drawing on Park’s argument that the “one-sex body” emerged in interpretations of the Latin translation of Galen’s On the Use of Parts in late medieval Latin surgical writing, I argue that the scientific objects pertaining to sex difference and reproductive biology—including male and female seeds, intersex or hermaphroditic anatomies, and “male” or “female” complexional heat—can be effectively understood to belong to different medical theories (the Hippocratic and the Aristotelian) as well as to combinations of scientific styles in anatomy and medicine. Secondly, I argue that the one-sex body was developed as a scientific object in surgical texts that combined the styles of experiment and hypothetical modeling for specific professional ends, namely, to define spatial and visual relationships that were practically relevant for surgeons to teach the proper identification, manipulation, and repair of different body parts. Following critics of Laqueur, I argue that the two-sex body was not a late-eighteenth century invention: rather, it was an effect of combined scientific styles in anatomy and medicine that allowed new (and competing) forms of evidence, scientific objects (such as the true hermaphrodite of an intermediate sex between male and female), and true or false sentences about sex difference, determination (by medical and legal experts), and the relationships between anatomy, gender presentation, and social roles. Finally, I suggest some possibilities and limitations for using scientific styles to understand the social history of sex difference across scientific and non-scientific domains—medical, legal, religious, and social—with some concluding remarks about contemporary debates about sex and gender.

15:45 Matteo Pasquinelli, Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia

Three styles of AI: induction, vectorialisation, and modelling 

 

17:00 Johannes Endres, University of California Riverside

Style and epistemology: basic strictures, and open questions

The modern concept of style goes back to Johann Joachim Winkelmann’s History of Ancient Art from 1764 in which it serves as a comparative category that allows art works to be discussed in juxtaposition with each other despite their different historical and cultural backgrounds, subjects, authorship, and material properties. As Winckelmann understands it, style makes the assessment of such differences possible in the first place. Because if no comparison would be reasonably feasible, all differences, whichever they were, would remain insignificant: “Without style, art historians have nothing to talk about, no problem to solve” (Whitney Davis). Style is thus not something art historians also do; instead, it is what they do. Consequently, it comes as no surprise that Heinrich Wölfflin, as late as in 1915, could conceive of style as the principle of art history.
Obviously, the same is not true when it comes to the role of style in the history and philosophy of science, where it became relevant only when the kind of art history that Winckelmann and Wölfflin envisioned had already come to an end. To Ludwik Fleck, when adopting the art-historical concept, Wölfflin was not even a footnote, while he is just a footnote to Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge which references Panofsky and his iconographical method throughout. That, I argue, is not a coincidence. It rather seems that the central relevance of style to the methodology of art history needed to be forgotten for it to acquire a new usefulness in a context mostly ignorant of the former. Yet such ignorance did not serve the concept’s new career well, and it has not been helpful to clarifying commonalities and differences of its use in art history as compared to the contexts of its later applications either.
First of all, in art history style does not carry any considerable epistemological weight. Neither Winckelmann nor Wölfflin refer to it in that sense. To them, it is a historical category of form, which crystallizes in the aesthetic appearances of a work. As a “Sehform” (optical scheme) in Wölfflin’s words, style functions much like Kant’s forms of intuition, which are not epistemologically expressive, at least no more than the human eye is, if epistemology is to remain a meaningful concept. That is not to say that art history did not link its subject to the notion of a “Weltanschauung” (world view) at all. On the contrary, examples of a world-view art history are abundant, especially in the aftermath of Wölfflin’s Principles and his famous claim that “each new form of crystallization [in artistic perception] brings a new aspect of world content to light”. However, such attempts stand in an older tradition, one not shared by either Wölfflin or Winckelmann, that of Hegel’s “Geisteswissenschaft” and his philosophy of history. It is a tradition that is also underlying Alois Riegl’s suggestion that style relates to the “world view of a period,” or Fleck’s concept of a “Denkstil” (style of reasoning), or Foucault’s foray into a history of knowledge formations. In all these cases, a collective style of sorts is believed to predetermine the cultural expressions of a time, place, or people. In art history, such attempts of grounding style in an epistemological framework let to highly problematic assumptions regarding the national or racial character of style supposedly regulating the artistic practices of those who perform them. While Wölfflin might not be innocent of such expansions, his theory of a “double root of style” as well as Winckelmann’s use of style as a classificatory tool point in an entirely different direction.
For all these reasons it seems timely and necessary to take a step back and call to mind basic strictures of style in art history as they might help inform its extensions into other fields as well as its possible use as an epistemological concept. My paper therefore proposes to delineate seven principles that distinguish style from concepts such as form, paradigm, or episteme, and to formulate a couple of open questions with which recent interdisciplinary discussions of style have left us at this point.

Variations on Styles, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives

Spring 2024 – Online Seminar

Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia – Department of Philosophy and Cultural HeritageEuropean Commission – This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101030646, “EPISTYLE”

Organizer:Matteo Vagelli (Ca’ Foscari/Harvard)

Link zoom:https://unive.zoom.us/j/88956275068

APRIL 29, 2024

17.30h CET – 16.30h GMT – 11.30 GMT-5

Chunglin Kwa, University of Amsterdam

The Dance and the Machine: The Islamic Reinterpretation of Ptolemy 

MAY 20, 2024

17.30h CET – 16.30h GMT – 11.30 GMT-5

Paolo Babbiotti, Università di Torino

Some Reflections on Style from the Perspective of Contemporary Anglo- American Philosophy

MAY 27, 2024

17.30h CET – 16.30h GMT – 11.30 GMT-5

Monica Calabritto, CUNYTruth, Verisimilitude, and Fiction: Narrativizing Early Modern Medicine and Law

JUNE 3, 2024

17.30h CET – 16.30h GMT – 11.30 GMT-5

Sergio Martinez, UNAM

Styles of Reasoning as Emergent Features of Cognitive Niches

JUNE 24, 2023

17.30h CET – 16.30h GMT – 11.30 GMT-5

Arianna Betti & Hein van den Berg, University of Amsterdam

Hacking for the Future: How to Model Styles of Reasoning and Scientific Revolutions

Further information:infoepistyle@gmail.com

Website:unive.it/epistyle

Matteo Vagelli, PhD

Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice/Harvard University) 

unive.it/epistyle

CFP – 9th International Workshop on Historical Epistemology: The Historical Epistemology of Scientific Styles (Venice, 27-28 June 2024)

Call for papers

9th International Workshop on Historical Epistemology

The Historical Epistemology of Scientific Styles

Venice, 27-28 June 2024

 

Abstract 

Presentation of the research network

This Workshop is the 9th edition of the annual meeting of the International Research Network on the History and Methods of Historical Epistemology. This network, founded in 2015, currently brings together 80 members from different countries, whose work is related to historical epistemology in a broad sense. It thus welcomes specialists in French epistemology of the xx century as well as people who have contributed to the renewal of historical epistemology under the impulse of members of the Max Planck Institute in the history of science. The objective of the activities of this network is not so much to separate historical epistemology radically from other studies of science, but rather to create a dialogue between different philosophical studies on the history of knowledge that pay particular attention to the conditions of emergence of scientific disciplines and their objects.

Each edition of the Workshop focuses on a specific theme. The previous edition, held in Dijon, was dedicated to the philosophy of environmental sciences. The former ones focused on the following themes: “Arts and Sciences, Historicizing Boundaries” (2022), “Historical Epistemology and Epistemology of History” (2020), “The Philosophy of Life Sciences: historical epistemology of biology and medicine” (2019), “Historical epistemology and the disunity of science” (2018), “For an historical epistemology of technological transformations” (2017), “A history of the present” (2016); “Historical epistemology: beginnings and current issues” (2015). The programs and arguments of the previous editions can be found at episthist.hypotheses.org.

Presentation of the 2024 edition on scientific styles

The 2024 edition of the workshop will also be the closing event of the EPISTYLE project “Style Matters: Scientific Pluralism and its Early-Modern Sources”, led by Matteo Vagelli under the supervision of Hasok Chang, Peter Galison and Marco Sgarbi since 2021. It will invite network members to contribute to the reflections on the key questions of the EPISTYLE project: “what happened to the traditional concept of style when it was migrated from rhetoric and the arts to the fields of history and philosophy of science? Where does the idea of different ‘styles’ of knowing come from, and how did the idea of an historically evolving plurality of standards of scientific inquiry emerge? To what extent do the objects of the sciences owe their existence to the styles that have enabled them to emerge and rendered them thinkable?”. For a presentation of the EPISTYLE project and its past activities see epistyle.

At different times and in different contexts, the notion of ‘style’ has been linked to knowledge and science (e.g. Fleck 1935, Daston-Otte 1991; Crombie 1994; Hacking 1982, 1992; Davidson 2001; Bredekamp-Schneider-Dünkel 2015; see Vicedo 1995, Gayon 1999, Sciortino 2023). Philosophers, historians, sociologists and scientists have made appeal to this notion generally in order to highlight the plurality and historicity of scientific ‘ways of thinking’. Since the 1970s, ‘style’ became involved in the so-called ‘pluralist turn’ in history and philosophy of science. (e.g. Ruphy 2017; see Vagelli 2024)

In contrast with the contemporary prevalence of empirically oriented micro-histories, styles of reasoning have been recognized as part of attempts at thinking up new forms of ‘big picture’ histories of science: “not as grand linear narratives, but as multi-levelled accounts of the conditions that made different kinds of science possible.” (Elwick 2012) In this light, a comparative anthropology of non-Western ‘styles of inquiry’ (e.g. Lloyd 2004) and an ‘ecological history’ of human reason have also been undertaken. (e.g. Hacking 2012)

This workshop is motivated by the question of whether ‘scientific styles’, variously defined, can be an object for historical epistemology. We will start by investigating the relation that a history of ‘scientific styles’ entertains with ‘classical’ historical epistemologies by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, for instance, or with Michel Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical models of historiography. Do these different approaches resonate with one another and to what extent? For example, Gilles-Gaston Granger’s use of the concept of style could be compared with later uses of the concept by Hacking. (Granger 1968)

The historical and epistemological underpinnings as well as the historiographic consequences of the notion of “style” will be at the center of the 9th Workshop on Historical Epistemology. We hope the discussion will be a moment for philosophers, historians and sociologists of science to encounter scholars with different methodological approaches. In particular, we expect contributions falling along one or more of the following five axes:

  1. Rediscovering ‘styles’: Who (why, when, and where) contributed to the idea of science and knowledge being characterized by one or more styles of thinking and doing? The workshop encourages further study of both better known as well as relatively neglected or uncharted sources for the idea of ‘styles’ in science. These can be found, especially, but not exclusively, in the work of philosophers, historians, sociologists, as well as in that by scientists themselves.
  2. A history of scientific ‘styles’: Is ‘style’ equally apt to account for continuity and discontinuity in the history of science and knowledge? Is it only meant to highlight the relativity of ‘styles of thinking’ or can it also be constructed in order to be able to account for progress in science? To what extent does the style-concept allow the mapping and refined analysis of emerging forms of science, such as those underpinning, for instance, artificial intelligence and the environmental sciences?
  3. ‘Styles’ from within/from without: What is the relation between ‘styles’ and their exteriority? Can the demarcation problem be rephrased through the notion of ‘style’? What makes a style of reasoning ‘scientific’ and what is the relation between scientific and ‘non-scientific’ styles (i.e. both literary, artistic, religious and ordinary or common-sense styles)? Can forms of knowledge ‘from below’, ‘citizen science’ or ‘community science’ be conceived of as ‘research styles’ in their own terms? What does the adoption of a given ‘style’ of inquiry imply on the level of the shaping of the scientific-selves? Can not only a history of forms of objectivity, but also of forms of subjectivities be told from the perspective of scientific styles?
  4. Social epistemology of ‘styles’: Since Fleck (1935), sociological analyses of scientific styles have played an important role in science studies. (e.g. Harwood 1993; Hunger-Seebacher-Holzer 2010) Moving from this background, and taking stock of the more recent acquisitions of STS approaches, we would like to raise the question as to what role does the intersubjective and collective dimension of ‘style’ play in the establishment, success and/or failure of given forms of investigation? What are the social conditions and larger implications of scientific ‘styles’? Is the talk of ‘national styles’ in science still relevant today? Is a ‘stylistic’ inquiry of science capable of capturing the institutional aspects and the power-dynamics at stake in the production of knowledge?
  5. Alternative concepts to styles: What is the added value (if any) of an analysis of knowledge and science conducted in ‘stylistic’ terms? What does the word and the concept of “style” add (if anything) to concepts such as ‘methods’, ‘ways of knowing’, or ‘research programmes’? What are the blind spots and presuppositions of the concept of style? What objections can be addressed to approaches that use this concept, from the perspective of philosophy, history and sociology of science?

Proposals (500 words plus a short presentation of the candidate) must be sent by April 15, 2024 (notification of acceptance or refusal will be sent by April 31), in .doc format, to epistemologiehistorique@gmail.com. The workshop will be conducted in English.

References

Bredekamp H., Schneider B. and Dünkel, V. eds. 2015. The Technical Image: A History of Styles in Scientific Imagery. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Crombie, A. C. 1994. Styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition: The history of argument and explanation especially in the mathematical and biomedical sciences and arts (Vol. 3). London: Duckworth.

Daston, L. and Otte, M. eds. 1991. Style in Science, special issue of Science in Context, vol. 4, no 2.

Davidson, A. 2001. The emergence of sexuality: Historical epistemology and the formation of concepts. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Elwick, J. 2012. Layered History: Styles of Reasoning as Stratified Conditions of Possibility. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, Part Special Issue: Styles of Thinking, 43, no. 4 (December 1, 2012): 619–27.

Fleck, L. 1935 [1979]. Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.                          

Gayon, J. 1999, On the uses of the category of style in the history of science. Philosophy & Rhetoric 32/3: 233-246.                                                 

Granger, G.-G. 1968. Essai d’une philosophie du style. Philosophies pour l’âge de la science. Paris: A. Colin.

Hacking, I. 1982. Language, truth and reason. In M. Hollis & S. Lukes (Eds.), Rationality and relativism (pp. 48–66). Oxford: Blackwell.

Hacking, I. 1992. ‘Style’ for historians and for philosophers. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 23(1), 1–20.

Hacking, I. 2012. Language, truth and reason thirty years later. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 43: 599–609.

Harwood, J. 1993. Styles of Thought. The German Genetics Community 1900-1933. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hunger, H., Seebacher, F. and Holzer, G. eds. 2010. Styles of Thinking in Science and Technology. Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference of the European Society for the History of Science, Vienna, VÖAW Verlag. Lloyd, G. 2004. Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections: Philosophical Perspectives on Greek and Chinese Science and Culture. Oxford University Press.

Ruphy, S. 2017. Scientific Pluralism Reconsidered. A New Approach to the (Dis)unity of Science. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Sciortino, L. 2023. History of Rationalities. Ways of Thinking from Vico to Hacking and Beyond. Cham: Palgrave MacMillan.

Vagelli, M. 2024. Styles of Science and the Pluralist Turn: Between Inclusion and Exclusion. Revue de synthèse 145(7), 3/4: DOI: 10.1163/19552343-14234053

Vicedo, M. 1995. Scientific Styles: Toward Some Common Ground in the History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science. Perspectives on Science 3/2: 231-5.

This workshop is organized by:

Épistémologie Historique. Research Network on the History and the Methods of Historical Epistemology

With the support of:

  • Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Department of Philosophy and Cultural Heritage;
  • European Commission (This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 101030646, “EPISTYLE”);
  • IHPST (UMR 8590, Paris 1/CNRS);
  • LIR3S (Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche Sociétés, Sensibilité, Soin, UMR7366 CNRS-université de Bourgogne);
  • IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck.

Organizing committee:

Caroline Angleraux (iBrain U1253, INSERM de Tours)
Lucie Fabry (Université de Bourgogne, LIR3S)
Iván Moya-Diez (IMGWF, Universität zu Lübeck)
Perceval Pillon (IHPST, Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne)
Matteo Vagelli (Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia)

Call for abstracts: Styles of Thinking & Doing in the Ecological History of Scientific Knowledge and Practices (Symposium at the 11th ESHS Conference, Barcelona 4-7 September 2024)

Dear colleagues,

Please find below a call for contributions to the 11th ESHS Conference (Barcelona, September 2024), on the symposium Styles of Thinking & Doing in the Ecological History of Scientific Knowledge and Practices.

Interested scholars are invited to send a paper proposal by November 18th, 2023 to Matteo Vagelli (matteo.vagelli@unive.it) and Joseba Pascual-Alba (joseba.pascual@ehu.eus).

Proposals should include a file of two pages with the following information:

    – (Page 1): Name, affiliation and a short bio (max 150 words).

    – (Page 2): Title and abstract (max 250 words).

Best wishes,

Matteo, Joseba

——–

Call for contributions:

Proposal for a Symposium at the 11th ESHS Conference, Barcelona 4-7 September 2024. Science, Technology, Humanity and the Earth.

Symposium: Styles of Thinking & Doing in the Ecological History of Scientific Knowledge and Practices

Ian Hacking (1982) initiated the project of exploring ‘styles of scientific reasoning’ by drawing from Alistair C. Crombie’s (1994) historical investigation on ‘styles of scientific thinking in the European tradition.’ Through this project, Hacking emphasized that ‘reason has a history’ and how standards of rationality emerge and evolve historically. Recognized as a valuable historical and philosophical tool for analysis (Hacking 1992), various historians and philosophers of science began incorporating this concept into their research (e.g., Davidson 1987; Gavroglu 1990; Schweber 1997; Radick 2000; Reck 2009; Elwick 2007; Winther 2012, 2013, 2015).

In later installments of his style project, Hacking (2012) related what he came to call ‘styles of thinking & doing’ to a cognitive and an ‘ecological’ history of reason (Atran 1990; Netz 1999). The aim of this symposium is to provide a reassessment of Hacking’s project, by engaging closely and critically with Hacking’s arguments on scientific styles. In this respect, some of the questions that this symposium will discuss are: What are the implications of Hacking’s theory of scientific styles at the level of language, truth, and understanding? What roles have styles played throughout the history of the sciences? How effective are styles as a historical-philosophical tool for comprehending scientific knowledge and practices? In what philosophical and historical ways could this project be further developed, especially within the context of an ecological history? 

Appel à contributions pour le Cahier Bachelard n° 18 : Suzanne Bachelard

Les propositions d’articles, d’une longueur de 30 000 à 50 000 signes, espaces et bibliographie comprises, doivent être envoyées par mail à l’adresse cahiers.bachelard@u-bourgogne.fr d’ici le 20 décembre.

Les propositions retenues par le comité éditorial seront ensuite soumises à une évaluation en double-aveugle par des pairs. Voir le Guide pour la préparation des manuscrits.

De Suzanne Bachelard, née en 1919 et décédée en 2007, on retient souvent les photos de Suzanne enfant, fille unique de Gaston Bachelard, élevée par son père qui l’a initiée dès son plus jeune âge aux congrès de philosophie. Au-delà de cette image, l’œuvre et la carrière de cette historienne et philosophe des sciences ont jusqu’à présent été peu étudiées. Ce numéro des Cahiers Bachelard cherche à y remédier en invitant à analyser différents aspects de la vie et de l’œuvre de Suzanne Bachelard.

Licenciée de mathématiques et agrégée de philosophie en 1946, Suzanne Bachelard commence sa carrière comme agrégée-répétitrice à l’École normale supérieure de Sèvres, et soutient ses thèses de doctorat d’État en 1957. Sa thèse principale de doctorat d’État a pour titre La conscience de rationalité : étude phénoménologique sur la physique mathématique (Suzanne Bachelard 1958a; Russo 1959) ; sa thèse complémentaire consiste en une traduction et un commentaire de Logique formelle et logique transcendantale de Husserl (Husserl 1957; Suzanne Bachelard 1958b; Lacroix 1958; Piatier 1957). Suzanne Bachelard obtient d’abord un poste de professeure à l’université de Lille, avant de devenir professeure à la Sorbonne en 1963 et directrice de l’Institut d’histoire des sciences et des techniques de 1971 à 1984 (Mosconi 2007; Pariente 2007; Gayon 2016).

Nous mettons en avant trois axes dans l’étude de son œuvre, tout en accueillant toute autre proposition qui entrerait dans le thème de ce numéro.

Axe 1 : Une réception de la phénoménologie husserlienne

Un premier axe d’étude de l’œuvre de Suzanne Bachelard consiste à étudier son rôle dans l’histoire de la phénoménologie française et, plus spécialement, dans l’histoire des réceptions françaises de la phénoménologie husserlienne. On pourra lire, dans cette perspective, le commentaire que Suzanne Bachelard a proposé de la logique de Husserl (Suzanne Bachelard 1958b; Benoist 1997), mais également l’effort proposé dans La conscience de rationalité pour appréhender la spécificité de la démarche scientifique en mobilisant les ressources conjointes de l’épistémologie bachelardienne et de la phénoménologie husserlienne.

Dans l’étude de ces textes, on pourra notamment se demander si Suzanne Bachelard reconnaît la pertinence de l’opposition entre une « philosophie du sujet » et une « philosophie du concept » dont Foucault (1994) a soutenu qu’elle était structurante dans l’histoire de la philosophie française du XXe siècle, ou si elle contribue à la remettre en cause. Foucault trouvait cette distinction formulée dans l’œuvre de Jean Cavaillès (1947), qui avait élaboré sa propre conception de l’activité scientifique dans une critique serrée de la logique transcendantale husserlienne (Vissio 2019). On pourra ainsi se demander ce qui singularise l’approche de Suzanne Bachelard parmi ces lectures épistémologiques de Husserl, en la comparant à celles qui ont été proposées par Cavaillès ou par des auteurs comme Gilles-Gaston Granger ou Jean-Toussaint Desanti.

Axe 2 : Suzanne Bachelard historienne des sciences

L’autre axe mis en avant dans ce numéro porte sur la pratique de l’histoire des sciences portée par Suzanne Bachelard. Nous accorderons une place importante à l’article « Épistémologie et histoire des sciences » (Suzanne Bachelard 1970), où elle définit ses propres orientations historiographiques en prenant position par rapport à celles de Gaston Bachelard (1972), mais aussi d’Alexandre Koyré (1966), Georges Canguilhem (1955) ou Michel Serres (1967). Selon Suzanne Bachelard, les principes historiographiques défendus dans « L’actualité de l’histoire des sciences » (Gaston Bachelard 1972) fondent une historiographie où « l’intérêt pour l’histoire est subordonné à l’intérêt pour la science » (Suzanne Bachelard 1970, p. 44). Soulignant les limites de cette dernière approche, elle cherche à ouvrir la possibilité d’une étude des sciences qui, tout en continuant à se présenter comme une « histoire épistémologique » (p. 46) et à assumer un caractère rétrospectif et normatif, propose une mise en œuvre plus prudente de l’histoire récurrente, qui se concentre sur « la micro-histoire » (p. 49) plutôt que sur les grands récits, et qui met en question les découpages spontanés du savoir. On pourra ainsi chercher à situer les positions de Suzanne Bachelard dans les débats sur la spécificité de l’histoire des sciences (Grimoult 2003), en les comparant notamment aux textes de Canguilhem (1975; 2009) ou Foucault (2008) qui reprennent également de l’œuvre de Gaston Bachelard cette question de la spécificité de l’histoire des sciences.

Un autre texte qui pourra retenir l’attention est « Quelques aspects historiques des notions de modèle et de justification des modèles » (Suzanne Bachelard 1979), où Suzanne Bachelard apporte une contribution à une épistémologie des modèles (Perru 2004; Varenne 2014), en formulant notamment une critique des thèses de Pierre Duhem (2016). Pour voir ces partis pris épistémologiques et historiographiques à l’œuvre dans l’étude de l’histoire des sciences, il serait particulièrement précieux de proposer une lecture des études historiques qui nourrissent La conscience de rationalité, prolongés par les travaux en histoire de la mécanique que Suzanne Bachelard a consacrés à Maupertuis et au principe de moindre action (Suzanne Bachelard 1958c; Suzanne Bachelard 1961), et par ses travaux en histoire de l’algèbre (Suzanne Bachelard 1967).

Axe 3 : Suzanne héritière et éditrice de Gaston

Un troisième axe consisterait à approfondir l’étude de ce qu’a impliqué, pour Suzanne Bachelard, d’être la fille de Gaston. Nous avons déjà mis en avant, dans la présentation des deux axes précédents, l’importance que le dialogue avec l’œuvre de Gaston Bachelard avait prise dans son propre itinéraire d’historienne et de philosophe des sciences. Mais parallèlement à cette comparaison des œuvres des deux Bachelard qui cherche à y déceler des formes d’héritage intellectuel, d’autres ressources pourraient être mobilisées pour interroger ce statut d’héritière d’un point de vue sociologique. On pourrait par exemple se proposer d’éclairer la trajectoire de Suzanne Bachelard par une étude sociologique des carrières féminines (Fauvel, Coffin et Trochu 2019), qui interroge les formes et les effets qu’a eu sur cette carrière le fait d’être immédiatement identifiée comme étant la fille de Gaston Bachelard. Une telle étude pourrait ainsi contribuer à montrer quelles possibilités et quelles impossibilités caractérisent les carrières féminines placées sous le signe de l’héritage du père, Suzanne Bachelard offrant une étude de cas remarquable dans la mesure où elle a occupé, à la fin de sa carrière, exactement les mêmes fonctions que celles qu’avait son père.

Il est également possible d’aborder cette question de l’héritage en un sens plus littéral, pour souligner que Suzanne Bachelard a eu un rôle d’exécutrice testamentaire. On pourra notamment étudier, dans cette perspective, le travail éditorial effectué par Suzanne Bachelard dans la publication posthume des *Fragments d’une poétique du feu* de Gaston Bachelard, en se demandant quels ont été les choix effectués dans l’établissement du texte, et quelle lecture Suzanne Bachelard y a donné de l’œuvre de son père.

Bibliographie indicative

Bachelard Gaston, 1972, « L’Actualité de l’histoire des sciences » dans L’engagement rationaliste, Paris, Presses universitaires de France (coll. « Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine »), p. 137‑152.

Bachelard Suzanne, 1979, « Quelques aspects historiques des notions de modèles et de justification de modèles » dans Élaboration et justification des modèles, Paris, Maloine, vol. 2/1, p. 3‑19.

Bachelard Suzanne, 1970, « Épistémologie et histoire des sciences » dans Actes du XIIe congrès international d’histoire des sciences, 1. A : Colloques, textes des rapports, Paris, A. Blanchard, p. 39‑51.

Bachelard Suzanne, 1967, La représentation géométrique des quantités imaginaires au début du XIXe siècle, Paris, Palais de la Découverte (coll. « Les conférences du Palais de la Découverte Histoire des sciences »).

Bachelard Suzanne, 1961, Les polémiques concernant le principe de moindre action au XVIIIe siècle, Paris, Palais de la Découverte (coll. « Les conférences du Palais de la Découverte – Histoire des sciences »).

Bachelard Suzanne, 1958a, La Conscience de rationalité, étude phénoménologique sur la physique mathématique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France.

Bachelard Suzanne, 1958b, « La Logique de Husserl », Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1958, vol. 19, no 1, p. 126‑127.

Bachelard Suzanne, 1958c, « Maupertuis et le principe de la moindre action », Thalès, 1958, vol. 9, p. 3‑36.

Benoist Jocelyn, 1997, Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie : Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne, Paris, France, Presses universitaires de France.

Canguilhem Georges, 2009, « Le rôle de l’épistémologie dans l’historiographie scientifique contemporaine » dans Idéologie et rationalité dans l’histoire des sciences de la vie : nouvelles études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, Paris, J. Vrin, p. 11‑36.

Canguilhem Georges, 1975, « L’objet de l’histoire des sciences » dans Études d’histoire et de philosophie des sciences, Paris, J. Vrin, p. 9‑23.

Canguilhem Georges, 1955, « La formation du concept de réflexe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles ».

Cavaillès Jean, 1947, Sur la logique et la théorie de la science, Paris, Presses universitaires de France.

Duhem Pierre, 2016, La théorie physique. Son objet, sa structure, Lyon, ENS Éditions (coll. « Bibliothèque idéale des sciences sociales »).

Fauvel Aude, Coffin Jean-Christophe et Trochu Thibaud, 2019, « Les carrières de femmes dans les sciences humaines et sociales (xixe-xxe siècles) : une histoire invisible ? », Revue d’histoire des sciences humaines, 15 décembre 2019, no 35, p. 11‑24.

Foucault Michel, 2008, L’archéologie du savoir, Paris, Gallimard (coll. « Tel »).

Foucault Michel, 1994, « Dits et Écrits n°219, Introduction à la traduction anglaise du Normal et du pathologique de Georges Canguilhem, trad. ang. par Carolyn R. Fawcett et Robert S. Cohen, Boston, D. Reidel, 1978 » dans Dits et écrits, III, Paris, Gallimard, p. 429 sq.

Gayon Jean, 2016, « L’institut d’histoire des sciences », Cahiers Gaston Bachelard, Cahier N° 14, <halshs-01286480>.

Grimoult Cédric, 2003, Histoire de l’histoire des sciences : historiographie de l’évolutionnisme dans le monde francophone, Genève, Librairie Droz.

Husserl Edmund, 1957, Logique formelle et logique transcendantale : essai d’une critique de la raison logique, traduit par Suzanne Bachelard, Paris, France, Presses universitaires de France.

Koyré Alexandre, 1966, Études d’histoire de la pensée scientifique, Paris, Presses universitaires de France.

Lacroix Jean, 1958, « Logique et Phénoménologie », Le Monde, 25 janv. 1958.

Mosconi Jean, 2007, « Éloge de Suzanne Bachelard », https://www.cnfhpst.org/sites/default/files/documents/eloge_Suzanne_Bachelard.pdf.

Pariente Jean-Claude, 2007, Retour à Bar-sur-Aube, https://www.liberation.fr/livres/2007/12/06/retour-a-bar-sur-aube_107936/ , 6 décembre 2007.

Perru Olivier, 2004, « Le modèle, le vivant et la complexité », Revue des questions scientifiques, 1 avril 2004, vol. 175, p. 113‑132.

Piatier J., 1957, « Quand les femmes se mêlent de logique… », Le Monde, 1 juill. 1957 p.

Russo F., 1959, « Recension de La conscience de la rationalité. Etude phénoménologique sur la physique mathématique », Archives de Philosophie, 1959, vol. 22, no 2, p. 312‑314.

Serres Michel, 1967, « Les anamnèses mathématiques », Archives internationales d’histoire des sciences, 1967, no 78‑79.

Varenne Franck, 2014, « Épistémologie des modèles et des simulations : tour d’horizon et tendances » dans Les modèles, possibilités et limites, Paris, Éditions Matériologiques (coll. « Modélisations, simulations, systèmes complexes »), p. 13‑46.

Vissio Gabriele, 2019, « Jean Cavaillès, de la logique de Husserl à la dialectique du concept » dans Jean-François Braunstein, Matteo Vagelli et Iván Moya Diez (eds.), L’épistémologie historique : Histoire et méthodes, Paris, Éditions de la Sorbonne (coll. « Philosophie »), p. 59‑71.

Annonce parution : Ian Hacking. Anthropologie et raison scientifique

 

Ian Hacking 

Anthropologie philosophique et raison scientifique

Textes réunis par M. Vagelli et traduits par A. Bandini, V. Guillin, M. Kirsch, L. Quéré et M. Vagelli.

Présentation de l’ouvrage:

Des calculs de probabilité aux troubles de la personnalité, des électrons à la maltraitance des enfants, de la logique de l’induction aux fous voyageurs, l’éventail des objets abordés par Ian Hacking peut sembler déroutant. Cependant, dans toutes ses recherches, à l’intersection de la philosophie et de l’histoire des sciences, il s’attache à examiner, en toutes leurs nuances et variétés, le rôle joué par l’expérimentation dans les sciences de la nature et la spécificité des « espèces humaines » comme objets des sciences humaines et sociales. Les textes réunis dans ce volume – dont certains publiés pour la première fois ici en français – montrent que les différents aspects de la production philosophique de Ian Hacking s’entre-répondent et dessinent ensemble un portrait complexe et articulé de la raison scientifique. Son approche originale, au croisement (entre autres) de l’analyse conceptuelle, de la philosophie du langage ordinaire, de l’archéologie foucaldienne et de l’histoire des sciences, a contribué à ouvrir de nouveaux chantiers de réflexion, faisant de Ian Hacking l’une des figures les plus dynamiques et influentes non seulement dans le domaine de l’épistémologie philosophique, mais aussi en sociologie, en anthropologie et en histoire.

Table des matières:

Prolégomènes à une anthropologie philosophique, par Matteo VAGELLI

Philosophie et histoire

Leçon inaugurale
« Style » pour historiens et philosophes
L’ontologie historique

Philosophie du laboratoire et technosciences

Est-ce que l’on voit à travers un microscope ?
La philosophie de l’expérience : illustrations de l’ultra-froid
L’importance de la classification chez le dernier Kuhn

Statistique, effets de boucle et sciences humaines

La statistique du suicide au XIXe siècle
Façonner les gens : le seuil de pauvreté
La maltraitance des enfants, entre fabrication et façonnement
Façonner les gens

Entretien

Ian Hacking. Le philosophe du présent

Origine des textes

Index des noms

Index des notions

Vrin, « Philosophie du présent », 2023, 386 p., 978-2-7116-3029-5, 24 €